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CONSTITUTIONALIZING INTERSTATE RELATIONS:
THE TEMPTATION OF THE DARK SIDE
WILLIAM BAUDE*
I.
What does the Constitution have to say about interstate relations?
Well, it depends on how you ask.
One of the main topics in interstate relations is the question of
what is called choice of law, which sounds very technical but fundamentally is the question of who governs—that is, which state
gets to govern any given transaction.
The same kind of question comes up at the federal level—federal
law versus state law—but it is dealt with by the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, which makes clear that if a federal law is constitutional, it is controlling.1 But there is no Supremacy Clause for
state law, which has forced people who worry about this question
to look harder and elsewhere for some sort of hint about which state
is supposed to govern which transaction.

* Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law
School. This Essay is a lightly edited version of Professor Baude’s remarks on March
14, 2020 at the Federalist Society’s Panel, “Originalism and Interstate Relations,” in dialogue with comments by Professors Douglas Laycock and Stephen Sachs and Judge
David Stras of the Eighth Circuit. They, along with Robert Leider and Jonathan Urick,
provided helpful comments, and Nathan Tschepik provided crucial research assistance. The SNR Denton Fund and Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund provided
research support.
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Of course, federal law often chooses to permit or incorporate state law. See William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374–76, 1423–30 (2012) (discussing examples).
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Now, the Supreme Court has largely abdicated any control of the
topic of choice of law. And just to give a concrete example: in 1981,
the Supreme Court decided a case called Allstate Insurance v. Hague.2
A friend and learned scholar has described this case to me as one of
the most indefensible Supreme Court opinions on any topic ever. It
is a case that comes from the Minnesota Supreme Court, where a
man named Ralph Hague was riding a motorcycle in Wisconsin
and crashed.3
Now, once upon a time, it was well-settled that accidents in Wisconsin were always going to be governed by Wisconsin law. Classically, states followed the rule of lex loci delicti,4 meaning the law of
the place of the wrong. Many states have changed that rule over the
course of the twentieth century, depending on whether the people
were from other states, and so on.5 But even under most of these
modern approaches, this should still have been an easy case. Mr.
Hague was in Wisconsin. He was from Wisconsin. The other driver
was from Wisconsin. Pretty much everything about the trip and the
accident involved Wisconsin.6
But the lawsuit was brought in Minnesota, which had a law that
was much more favorable to Mr. Hague, and the Minnesota Supreme Court seized on basically one fact, which is that Mr. Hague
worked in Minnesota.7 Now, he was not on his way to work. The
accident had nothing to do with work. But he had been to Minnesota pretty regularly, and that, plus the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
2. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
3. Id. at 305.
4. See, e.g., Bain v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 98 N.W. 241, 243–44 (Wis. 1904), overruled by Wilcox
v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 1965); see also Phelps v. Benson, 90 N.W.2d 533, 535
(Minn. 1958), overruling recognized by Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Minn.
1973).
5. Luther L. McDougal III, The Real Legacy of Babcock v. Jackson: Lex Fori Instead of
Lex Loci Delicti and Now It’s Time for a Real Choice-of-Law Revolution, 56 ALB. L. REV. 795,
795–96 (1993); Douglas M. Deibert, Comment, Lex Loci Delicti: The Conflict Continues, 17
S.D. L. Rev. 374, 375–78 (1972).
6. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 44–45 (Minn. 1978).
7. Id. at 46.
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conclusion that their own law was just better than Wisconsin’s,
caused them to think that they should apply their own law.8 This
isn’t something that Minnesota made up. It reflected the influence
of Professor Robert A. Leflar, who wrote an influential article advocating this approach.9
The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether anything in the Constitution stops the State of Minnesota and the Minnesota Supreme Court from deciding that their law is just better
than everyone else’s and applies even to things that have almost
nothing to do with their state. But the Supreme Court turned down
the opportunity to say that this was madness. Instead, the plurality
opinion by Justice Brennan demonstrated uncharacteristic judicial
restraint:
It is not for this Court to say whether the choice-of-law
analysis suggested by Professor Leflar is to be preferred
or whether we would make the same choice-of-law
decision if sitting as the Minnesota Supreme Court. Our
sole function is to determine whether the Minnesota
Supreme Court's choice of its own substantive law in this
case exceeded federal constitutional limitations.10

And they concluded nothing in the federal Constitution did.
This is pretty much where things stand today. When it comes to
one of the most fundamental questions of interstate relations, if a
state supreme court wants to apply their own law to almost anything, then as long as there is some connection, the U.S. Supreme
Court will let them.11
8. See id. at 49 (finding that “[t]he Minnesota rule is better” and that “[t]his consideration clearly mandates application of Minnesota law”).
9. See generally Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966).
10. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981).
11. See Charles M. Thatcher, Could a State Court's Selection of Another State's Substantive Law Exceed Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 S.D. L. REV. 20, 21–22 (2016)
(“The ease with which the proponent of a state court’s choice of law can satisfy the
Hague test makes it unlikely that a state court’s application of the substantive law of
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But not all issues in interstate relations are left to the states. Last
year, in a case called Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt,12 the Supreme
Court had a very different question of interstate relations—or, at
least, what they thought was a very different question—which is
whether or not one state, in this case the State of California, ought
to be able to claim sovereign immunity in another state’s court, in
that case, the State of Nevada.13
This too is a question of interstate relations. One might even call
it a question of choice of law. The Nevada Supreme Court sits over
here deciding whether or not it can hear a case against the Franchise
Tax Board of California. They conclude that the answer is yes.14 California thinks that Nevada’s choice is constitutionally out of
bounds, so they go to the U.S. Supreme Court. If we were applying
the same kind of deference the Court applies on choice of law, you
would expect the U.S. Supreme Court to say, “It is not for us to decide whose theory of sovereign immunity controls.”15 But that is not
what the Supreme Court said.

another state could ever be held to exceed the modest limitations the Constitution imposes on choice of law.”); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1057, 1058–59 (2009) (noting lax standard). The rare exception is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), where the Court held that the Kansas Supreme
Court could not apply Kansas law to class action plaintiffs with “no apparent connection to the State of Kansas.” Id. at 815, 823.
12. 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019).
13. Id. at 1490 (“This case . . . requires us to decide whether the Constitution permits
a State to be sued by a private party without its consent in the courts of a different
State.”).
14. See id. at 1491 (describing the case’s history).
15. Professor Sachs and I filed an amicus brief arguing that the Constitution did not
speak to the recognition of sovereign immunity in state court, though a state might
have other constitutional options to avoid an adverse judgment. Brief of Professors William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Hyatt , 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (No. 17-1299). See generally William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing this
view).
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Instead, the Supreme Court stepped in—in what we could call
Laycockian fashion16—to say this is an area where the Constitution
controls. There is nothing in the text about this. There is nothing in
the text that says which state’s law applies in a multi-state conflict.
But the Supreme Court said, “Each State’s equal dignity and sovereignty under the Constitution implies certain constitutional ‘limitations on the sovereignty of all of its sister States.’”17 The Constitution “divests the States of the traditional diplomatic and military
tools that foreign sovereigns possess” and “deprives them of the
independent power to lay imposts or duties on imports and exports,” and thus, the Court concluded, it “embeds interstate sovereign immunity within the constitutional design.”18 Nevada’s choice
to breach sovereign immunity violates a pre-constitutional norm,
and California no longer has all of the pre-constitutional tools to
retaliate. And therefore, the Court concludes, there are doctrines of
federal law that now control things that previously were left to the
raw power of the states.
Again, the same things might have been said in the choice of law
context. The aggressive assertion of jurisdiction by the State of Minnesota violated a pre-constitutional norm, and the other states no
longer have all of the pre-constitutional tools to retaliate. Taken seriously, the logic of Franchise Tax Board should lead to the constitutionalization of choice of law doctrine just as much as interstate sovereign immunity.
Instead, we have a strange inconsistency. In one area—sovereign
immunity—the Supreme Court says that rules of federal constitutional law announced by the Supreme Court will control this. But
in an analogous, and far more important area—choice of law—the
16. See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992) (advocating
constitutional limits on choice of law).
17. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1497 (internal alteration omitted) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)).
18. Id.
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Supreme Court says that there is almost no constitutional constraint
on what the states can do. Sometimes we live with these inconsistencies in doctrine for a long time. But they usually are a clue that
something has gone wrong.
II.
One way forward would be for the Supreme Court to constitutionalize choice of law doctrine. Professor Douglas Laycock has advocated this in a groundbreaking and important article.19 It uses
some constitutional doctrines I do not completely endorse to
achieve some results that I think might be good.20 So, we might call
this “the temptation of the dark side of The Force.”
And it is tempting indeed. I would be reasonably happy living in
a world where the Constitution and Supreme Court doctrine controlled all questions of interstate relations. This is not an area where
the states can be neutral arbiters, and the Supreme Court is as good
a neutral arbiter as we have these days.
Yet as I have suggested, I have some textual misgivings about that
world. For instance, I am not convinced that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does quite as much work as Professor Laycock advocates. On the one hand, it says that “Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”21 It sounds like nothing could be
more than full faith and credit. But, on the other hand, it says that
Congress is allowed to decide “the Effect thereof,”22 which means
19. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 297–301 (advocating that in the absence of congressional action under the Effects Clause, the Court should develop federal choice-of-law
rules under the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
20. See also Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction between Statutes and
Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 664 n.18 (2013) (“As a policy matter, there is much
to be said for the system contemplated by Professor Laycock. But as a historical matter,
the Constitution probably was not really understood to require such a system.”).
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
22. Id.
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that what the effects of those laws are should be left up to Congress.
Indeed, this was the original understanding: the Constitution required states to accept other states’ laws as evidence of the law, but
it did not speak to the legal effect of those laws. That question was
left to Congress.23
There is also no provision of the constitutional text that says that
state jurisdiction is territorially limited, although this is an important conflicts principle.24 And even if we overlook the absence
of text, and say that the doctrine just has to be an unwritten structural postulate of the Constitution, a constitutional doctrine of territoriality leads to some practical problems, and has led to them in
the past: When a dispute has connections to multiple territories,
which territory governs? So the principle of territoriality, on its
own, will not answer questions like, “What happens when an event
affects more than one state?” Or, “What happens when an accident
involves somebody driving from one state to another or people
from one state and the accident takes place in another state?” Besides the principle of territoriality, you need what conflicts nerds
would call a principle of localization—that is, a principle that determines which act really matters.25
23. See Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201,
1206 (2009) (“The real significance of the [Full Faith and Credit] Clause was the power
it granted to Congress to specify that effect later.”); David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule
of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L. J. 1584, 1588 (2009) (making a similar statement); Ralph
U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981) (making a similar statement); Nelson, supra note 20,
at 664 n.18 (endorsing Professor Sachs’s position).
24. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 317 (“The Constitution thus assumes that states are
territorial, though it never quite says so.”).
25. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5.4, at 53,
§ 53.2, at 304, § 59.2, at 308 (1935) (concerned with establishing “localizing rules”); Joseph M. Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the
Conflict of Laws: A Study of Problems Involved in Determining Whether or Not the Forum
Should Follow Its Own Choice of a Conflict-of-Laws Principle, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 241–43
(1941); Nelson, supra note 20, at 671–73 (describing need for localization under the First
Restatement); Laycock, supra note 16, at 322–31 (proposing some different localizing
rules than Professor Beale’s); Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of
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The Supreme Court did briefly experiment with constitutionalizing territoriality and localization, but it was back in the Lochner era
when the Supreme Court could determine, using a complicated
doctrine of vested rights, that the constitutional right to have a particular state’s law apply to a case was vested under the Due Process
Clause as soon as a particular act happened.26 Most people do not
think the Lochner era’s substantive due process doctrine is something we should return to.27 Professor Laycock does want to restore
that doctrine’s application to choice of law. But unless we do, I am
not convinced that a constitutionalization of the choice of law
would be possible. Again, you see why I call it the dark side.
III.
In any event, it seems to me that right now we live in a strange
world in between, where the Supreme Court is sometimes trying to
constitutionalize principles of interstate relations, as it does in the
sovereign immunity context, and then, other times, continuing to
abdicate them as it does in the choice-of-law context, which is
much, much more important. If we are going to constitutionalize
this area, we ought to get something good out of it.

Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1830–36 (2005) (discussing theoretical problems with First Restatement’s territorial approach).
26. See James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L. REV.
1509, 1512 (2008) (footnote omitted) (“[O]f the eighteen Lochner Era opinions that used
liberty of contract reasoning to sustain constitutional challenges to state and federal
laws, eight involved instances of a state supposedly exceeding its territorial jurisdiction.”).
27. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 387–88, 418–19 (2011). To be
sure, the meaning (and implications) of the “Lochner era” are contested. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873–74 (1987). For competing accounts, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE FREEDOM (2011); Randy E. Barnett, After All These Years, Lochner Was Not Crazy—
It Was Good, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 437, 437–438 (2018).

No. 1]

Constitutionalizing Interstate Relations

65

Still, suppose we don’t. What would it look like to turn away from
the dark side? As Professor Stephen E. Sachs has discussed, interstate relations were once governed not primarily by constitutional
law but by the shared, unwritten, “general law.”28
The First Restatement of Conflicts and its doctrine of vested rights
lent itself to constitutionalization. The century before the First Restatement, however, there was a brilliant treatise on conflict of laws
by Justice Joseph Story, which we might see as a sort of “zeroth restatement,” the original Restatement.29 We could have done a lot
better by trying to stick with that.
Justice Story described a set of territorial rules, but they were
principles of general and international law, and so they were more
flexible. Justice Story did not turn them into platonic axioms where
there was one unique answer to everything. When the First Restatement tried to do that, it found itself forced into weird epicycles
about what to do if someone was poisoned and traveled across multiple states while the poison took effect, and other strange things
like that.30
People rightly thought the First Restatement had become both
byzantine and unforgiving, but rather than do something sensible,
like go back to the zeroth restatement and loosen the edges of the
territorial rules, they instead started jettisoning the old rules altogether.31

28. Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1252–53, 1268–69
(2017); Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1875
(2012).
29. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834).
30. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 377, cmt. a, illus. 2 (1934).
31. Here I profoundly agree with Professor Laycock. See Laycock, supra note 16, at
322 (“Beale's rules were crude, but territoriality did not make them so. They were crude
because they tried to derive the solution to every choice-of-law controversy from the
single premise that rights vested at the place of the last act necessary to the right. Critics
of the Restatement appear to have assumed that all of Beale's mistakes were inherent
in territorialism, and they diverted a generation of conflicts scholars from the task of
developing more sensible and sophisticated territorial rules.”).
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It may be too late to bring back the old rules themselves. General
law can cease to be the law if it falls out of use, and approaches
based on comity have to consider the world as they find it. But it
may not be too late to bring back the logic and the approach of a
bygone age.
And if it is too late, then maybe the Supreme Court can at least
constitutionalize some good rules for us.
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ADDENDUM
In response to a question about lessons we can learn from the Supreme
Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction over controversies between states:
This is a not very widely studied area of the Supreme Court’s
docket unless you teach water law, contract law, or a couple of the
other areas. Yet, every year there is something on the Supreme
Court’s docket that involves neighboring states fighting about a
river, or an island, or something like that.32
My own impression from those cases are two lessons—one optimistic, one pessimistic.
The optimistic lesson—especially for something like Professor
Sachs’s view—is that the Court takes a general law approach to a
lot of these cases, relying on unwritten background principles.33
The Court’s approach in these decisions recognizes that there is a
general principle governing where the border goes. Even though
these questions—who ought to own Ellis Island34 or what they
ought to do with the lobster35—are questions of policy, the Justices
do not take advantage of their control over the case to pursue their
own policy analysis.
Thus, the Justices seem to think their job is to make the federal
system run more smoothly by preserving stable expectations to apply whatever law has been in place for a long time, if they can. That
sounds good. If you take the Supreme Court’s performance in those
cases, it is what we hope for from a federal tribunal in charge of
interstate relations. That is the good part.

32. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 758, 758 (2018) (Mem.) (finding that
Wyoming’s water usage practices violated the Yellowstone River Compact).
33. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
34. See New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 770–71 (1998) (holding that New Jersey
has sovereign authority over the “new” land added to Ellis Island through land reclamation projects).
35. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 364–65 & n.1 (1976) (resolving a dispute between the two states over lobster fishing rights in a shared river).
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The bad part is, from what I can tell, the Supreme Court does not
like these cases very much. So when they hear the cases—and
maybe this is partly a necessity—they generally appoint a special
master who is not one of the Justices to be in charge of most the
case, including fact finding, negotiating with the parties, managing
a lot of the procedure, and then they, as a court, check in on the case
every couple of years when the parties have some sort of problem.36
Thus, the Supreme Court is exercising oversight over the case,
and, if there is a legal issue, they ultimately do resolve it through
oral argument and a written opinion. Yet, for the amount of time
the case spends supposedly in the Supreme Court, it spends most
of its time in front of a temporary agent of the Court where the Justices do not have to be concerned with it. While, again, there are
practical reasons for that, I get the sense it is not an area of the Supreme Court’s docket that they really think deserves their attention.
Beyond delegating the administration of these cases, the Justices
also sometimes refuse to hear them at all. Now the Constitution and
the federal statues about the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
might lead you to believe that when two states have a dispute about
something, they are entitled to bring it to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has jurisdiction. No other court has jurisdiction.37
The normal practice in jurisdictional rules is that when a federal
court has jurisdiction—especially when nobody else does—and
somebody shows up and sues, the federal court puts it in its docket
and deals with it.
Yet, the Supreme Court has created a doctrine where they decide
whether they want to deal with it, even though if they say no, there

36. See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 653–57 (2002)
(explaining the role of special masters in original jurisdiction cases).
37. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (addressing the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction);
28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018).
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is nothing else for the states to do.38 The Supreme Court regularly
just declines to hear cases between two states.39 Justice Thomas and
Justice Alito have very recently started objecting to this practice,
but they are the only ones.40
So, the good news is when the Supreme Court hears these cases,
it seems to do a decent job. But the bad news is that even if the Supreme Court agrees to hear a case, they do not necessarily hear it
very much, and they reserve the right not to hear it.

38. See Kristin A. Linsley, Original Intent: Understanding the Supreme Court's Original
Jurisdiction in Controversies Between States, 18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 21, 47 (2017)
(“[E]ven when the parties do not have access to another forum in which to litigate, the
Court still may use its discretion on a case-by-case basis to deny leave to file an original
action.”); see also SUP. CT. R. 17(3) (providing that “[t]he initial pleading [in an action
invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction] shall be preceded by a motion for leave to
file”).
39. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 560–61
(1985) (explaining that the Court has denied these cases “[f]or many years” and giving
several examples).
40. Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016) (Thomas, J., joined by Alito, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Federal law does not, on its face, give this Court
discretion to decline to decide cases within its original jurisdiction.”); Arizona v. California, 140 S. Ct. 684, 684 (2020) (Thomas, J., joined by Alito, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“[W]e likely do not have discretion to decline review in cases within our
original jurisdiction that arise between two or more States.”).

